CASE COMMENTARIES
BANKRUPTCY
A nonrecourse creditor cannot use Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to
transform into a recourse creditor if its application would put the creditor in a
better position than it would have been outside of bankruptcy. In re Montgomery
Ward, LLC, 634 F.3d 732 (3d Cir. 2011).
By Jeff Upshaw
When a party files for bankruptcy protection, courts often allow the bankrupt
party to continue using some of its mortgaged properties after reorganization. The
Bankruptcy Code allows nonrecourse creditors of such mortgaged property to treat
the outstanding mortgage as recourse debt; therefore, the mortgage is recoverable
against the bankrupt party personally. However, the use of this provision is limited.
The court in In re Montgomery Ward, LLC confronted three issues: (1) whether res
judicata precluded the Plan Administrator of Montgomery Ward’s second
bankruptcy filing (“Montgomery Ward II Plan Administrator”) from contesting the
nature of a lease and sublease agreement, (2) whether Montgomery Ward was liable
for common area maintenance (“CAM”) expenses under the lease and sublease
agreement, and (3) whether Montgomery Ward was personally liable for the
mortgage that was taken out to construct a department store (“Mortgage”).
Prior to its bankruptcy filings, Montgomery Ward held a strong position in
the retail merchandising business. Montgomery Ward filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy on two separate occasions. The first bankruptcy claim, filed in 1997, was
focused on reorganization, while the second claim, filed in 2000, was intended to
close Montgomery Ward’s operations and liquidate its remaining assets.
In the early 1970’s, Montgomery Ward was involved in the development of
the Jefferson Square Mall in Joliet, Illinois. In the beginning stages of development,
Montgomery Ward entered into a contract with Jolward Associates Limited
Partnership (“Jolward”), in which Jolward agreed to build a department store.
Montgomery Ward put up its interest in the land as collateral in exchange for the
Mortgage, which was financed by State Farm Life Insurance Co. (“State Farm”).
The financing agreement stated that Montgomery Ward assumed “no personal
liability for the payment of any principal, interest or premium on the [Mortgage]
Notes.” Because State Farm could only recover against Montgomery Ward’s interest
165
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in the property, and not against Montgomery Ward personally, the Mortgage was
nonrecourse. Jolward leased the department store and the land back to Montgomery
Ward through a lease and sublease agreement (“Lease”), which specified
Montgomery Ward’s obligations for rent and CAM expenses related to the property.
In the first bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor-in-possession (“Ward I
Debtor-In-Possession”) agreed to remain bound by the Lease. Jolward had
previously assigned its rights under the Lease to State Farm. Montgomery Ward was
past due on rent payments, as well as CAM expenses accrued in prior years, but the
parties were able to settle this dispute with State Farm, receiving the full amount in
arrears.
During or before the second bankruptcy proceeding, Dika-Ward purchased
State Farm’s interest in the Mortgage and the Lease and subsequently filed proofs of
claim on both interests. Dika-Ward argued that Montgomery Ward was personally
liable for the Mortgage because the proceedings of the first bankruptcy rendered the
mortgage “recourse” under section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Montgomery
Ward rejected their outstanding obligations under the Lease relating to outstanding
rent payments, as well as unpaid CAM expenses.
Dika-Jefferson, a subsidiary of Dika-Ward, also filed a proof of claim for
unpaid CAM expenses. Montgomery Ward settled the Dika-Jefferson claim by
conveying its interest in the land to Dika-Jefferson (“Ward II Stipulation”).
Montgomery Ward filed an objection to Dika-Ward’s claim for damages under the
Lease, asserting that the Ward II Stipulation satisfied the debt and also that the Lease
was, in reality, an agreement for structured financing, under which Dika-Ward’s only
remedy would be to seize the collateral used to secure the financing. Dika-Ward
then claimed, citing the doctrine of res judicata, that Montgomery Ward could
neither reject these obligations nor dispute the nature of the Lease. Dika-Ward
contended that Montgomery Ward was precluded from arguing this issue because
the Ward I Debtor-In-Possession had the opportunity to argue it at the first
bankruptcy proceeding.
Res judicata is a legal theory that bars the re-litigation of an already decided
issue. A claim is barred under this principle if “there has been (1) a final judgment
on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same claim and (3) the same parties or
their privies.” The “same party” requirement can be stretched to include a nonparty,
“if the nonparty had a substantive legal relationship with a party, and a successor in
interest has such a relationship with its predecessor.”
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A mortgage may be treated as recourse in bankruptcy law if the bankruptcy
client continues to use the mortgaged property in its reorganization. In such a case,
the original nonrecourse creditor is allowed a claim under section 502 of the
Bankruptcy Code as if its security interest were recourse. Usually, a nonrecourse
claim can only be recovered by foreclosing on the mortgaged property. However,
recourse claims are recoverable against both the debtor’s property and the debtor
personally if there is a remaining debt after seizure of the property. Treating the
nonrecourse claim in this way does not, however, change the essence of the interest.
The claim is designated as nonrecourse for distribution purposes only.
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Ward II Plan
Administrator was not the “same party” as the Ward I Debtor-In-Possession, and,
therefore, res judicata did not preclude the Ward II Plan Administrator from arguing
the nature of the Lease. Regardless of the Lease’s classification, the court held that,
because the Ward II Stipulation released Montgomery Ward from any liability for
CAM expenses, the Ward II Debtor-In-Possession was not liable to Dika-Ward for
CAM expenses. Finally, the court held that the Mortgage, while treated as recourse
under section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, remained a nonrecourse claim. If the
Mortgage became a recourse claim, it would have the “result of placing the
nonrecourse creditor in a better position than it would have been outside of
bankruptcy, a result not contemplated by Section 1111(b).”
The court’s holding narrowed existing points of law. Res judicata, a murky
doctrine, poses difficult issues in terms of defining its elements. The “same party”
element is somewhat of a “term of art,” given the advent of non-mutual res judicata.
In holding that the Ward I Debtor-In-Possession and the Ward II Plan
Administrator were not the “same party,” the court tapered the “same party”
requirement of res judicata. While the Ward I Debtor-In-Possession and Ward II
Plan Administrator could conceivably be considered “in privity,” the Ward II Plan
Administrator’s interests were broader, and, therefore, the parties did not represent
the same interest.
Furthermore, the court narrowed the benefits to a nonrecourse creditor that
is able to temporarily treat its claim as recourse under section 502 of the Bankruptcy
Code. While the court upheld the use of this doctrine, it also limited its use to
situations in which the nonrecourse creditor would be put in a worse position than it
would have been outside of bankruptcy.
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These holdings represent a significant development for bankruptcy attorneys.
The court construes res judicata principles in a narrower sense than might have been
previously contemplated in this area of law. The court’s holding gives a significant
advantage to a corporation that files for bankruptcy more than once, as it now has a
strong precedent for arguing issues that were not raised in a prior bankruptcy
proceeding. Furthermore, bankruptcy attorneys now have more leverage in dealing
with nonrecourse creditors that are treated as recourse creditors pursuant to section
1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. As long as the bankruptcy attorney can prove that
the nonrecourse creditor, if treated as a recourse creditor, would be better off than it
would have been outside of bankruptcy, then the creditor will retain its status as a
nonrecourse creditor. Consequently, the creditor can only recover against the
encumbered property, not the bankruptcy client personally.
________

Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code does not exonerate a purchaser of
assets from all future tort claims arising subsequent to the sale of assets,
regardless of when the product that caused the accident was purchased.
Morgan Olson, LLC v. Frederico, 445 B.R. 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
By Heather Grossner
It is well settled that the sale of an estate’s interest in property, including
claims that arise from the assets being sold, discharges the purchaser from in personam
liability for pre-confirmation claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Stated differently, Section 363(f) removes all of the accompanying liabilities
from the transferred assets so that the buyer can purchase the assets without fear
that the estate’s creditors will enforce their claims against those assets. However,
until Morgan Olson, LLC v. Frederico, the issue of whether to extend this rule to
discharge the purchaser from liability for all future tort claims arising subsequent to
the sale of assets remained unsettled. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York clarified this issue and held that Section 363(f) does
not discharge the purchaser of an estate from all future tort claims. Instead, the
purchaser of the estate assumed all future claims arising from accidents that occurred
subsequent to the sale of assets, regardless of when the product was purchased. The
court’s limited holding was that the prior bankruptcy sale did not affect the
claimants’ ability to pursue their claim against the purchaser of the assets.
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In Morgan Olson, Grumman Olson Industries, Inc. (the “Debtor”) designed,
manufactured, and sold products for the truck body industry, which were
incorporated into vehicles sold by Ford Motor Company and General Motors
Corporation. The Debtor filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on December 9,
2002. Thereafter, the court approved the sale of certain assets of the Debtor,
pursuant to section 363(f), to MS Truck Body Corporation, a predecessor of Morgan
Olson, LLC (collectively, “Morgan”). The order for the sale of the assets (the
“Order”) clarified Morgan’s liability for future tort claims arising from allegedly
faulty products manufactured and sold by the Debtor prior to the sale to Morgan.
First, the Order released Morgan from potential creditors seeking to collect on
claims against the estate by seizing the assets that the Debtor sold to Morgan.
Second, the Order released Morgan from successor liability and any obligations of
the Debtor arising after the Debtor sold the assets to Morgan. Because of these two
provisions in the Order, Morgan assumed that the Order exonerated it from all
future liability.
On October 15, 2008, Ms. Frederico sustained serious injuries when the
FedEx truck she was driving crashed into a telephone pole. The Fredericos
commenced a personal injury action in the Superior Court of New Jersey on
October 8, 2009, and alleged that the Debtor manufactured, designed, and sold the
defective FedEx truck in 1994 and that Morgan, as the Debtor’s successor, was liable
to them.
On March 24, 2010, Morgan commenced the present suit, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief that the Order exonerated it from any liability arising
from products manufactured, designed, and sold prior to its purchase of the
Debtor’s assets. Both parties moved for summary judgment and disputed the
Debtor’s role in the manufacturing and sale of the FedEx truck. However, this
dispute was immaterial to the real question that the court faced, which was whether
the Order relieved Morgan from all liability to the Fredericos.
In reviewing the original Order, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the Order did not affect the Fredericos’
right to sue Morgan based on practicality and due process. However, the court did
not determine whether Morgan was liable to the Fredericos, as the only task the
court faced was to interpret the Order. The first issue the court dealt with was
whether it had proper subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Morgan’s claim. The
court relied on a previous finding that bankruptcy courts retain jurisdiction to
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interpret and enforce their previous orders. Here, this court had enforced the prior
Order; therefore, it had the right to examine that order and interpret whether or not
it exonerated Morgan from all future liability. Additionally, the court examined the
following Petrie factors to determine whether it had proper subject matter
jurisdiction: (1) the dispute was based on rights established by the sale order; (2) the
bankruptcy court retained post-confirmation jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its
own orders; and (3) the dispute involved an issue already before the bankruptcy
court. After applying these factors, the court affirmed that it had proper subject
matter jurisdiction because, under the first Petrie factor, the resolution of the dispute
between Morgan and the Fredericos was based on rights the Order created, and,
under the second Petrie factor, Morgan’s request for declaratory relief begged the
court to interpret and enforce the Order while enjoining the Fredericos from
proceeding with their personal injury claim.
Next, the court determined that the scope of Section 363(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code not only provides in rem relief, cleansing all property sold of all
claims and interests of creditors, but it also authorizes the bankruptcy court to grant
in personam relief that exonerates the purchaser from successor liability. The
Fredericos sought in personam relief and were attempting to collect from Morgan.
They based their claim on Morgan’s actions after the sale, including Morgan’s
benefiting from the product’s goodwill, holding itself out as the manufacturer of the
Debtor product line, and continuing to market the Debtor’s product line to FedEx.
The third issue the court faced was whether the Fredericos’ right was a claim
of liability. The court recognized that, although “claim” has a very broad and
encompassing meaning, the term is limited in two types of tort claims. The first type
includes those claims by persons who had pre-petition contact with or exposure to
the debtor’s product but have not yet manifested symptoms or discovered their
injury. The second type includes claims of people who are injured after the asset sale
because of a defective product manufactured and sold prior to the asset sale, which
includes the Fredericos’ claim.
The court looked at multiple tests to determine whether the Fredericos’
rights were claims, including the “fair contemplation test,” which explains that, if the
occurrence of a future event that would trigger the liability was within the
contemplation of the parties when the parties created their relationship, the future
event is a claim. Another test that the court examined was the “accrued state law
claim test,” which defines a claim as an event that results in an injury for which
compensation is justified when a person is exposed to a product before the asset
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sale. Finally, the court looked at the “conduct test,” which recognizes a claim when
all actions constituting the tort, except the injury itself, occurred prior to the asset
sale.
After weighing all of these tests and mixtures thereof, the court found that
the Fredericos’ right to payment fell within the “conduct test” and “fair
contemplation test” because the Fredericos had no contact with the Debtor prior to
the accident and held no claims against the Debtor’s estate at the time of the
bankruptcy sale. The court found that an issue of greater importance was that the
Fredericos had no notice of the bankruptcy sale. This was problematic because sale
orders that purportedly free purchasers from future liabilities are not binding against
parties who do not receive adequate notice. Additionally, a future claims
representative did not protect the Fredericos’ rights. Thus, the court held that it
would be grossly unfair to treat the Fredericos’ rights as claims that the Order
exonerated.
Morgan Olson should remind transactional attorneys to warn their clients who
are interested in purchasing the assets of a company in a bankruptcy sale that a
bankruptcy sale order does not exonerate that purchaser from all future tort claims,
even those that occur after the sale as a result of defective products manufactured
and sold prior to the bankruptcy sale. This liability, depending on the type of
company and assets that the purchaser is interested in purchasing, may persuade a
client that he or she should not purchase the assets due to the risk of future
liabilities. However, attorneys could suggest that the client take precautions and
prepare for future tort claims by establishing a trust fund for the sole purpose of
paying future liabilities. The holding in Morgan Olson is not a new holding but, rather,
a reminder that a sale order, although it may claim to release a purchaser from future
liability, does not necessarily do so because of the importance of due process and
practicality for plaintiffs who deserve to recover.
________
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BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Corporations do not have “personal privacy” protection under Exemption
7(C) of the Freedom of Information Act. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011).
By Jed Crumbo
By requiring United States government agencies to make their records and
documents publicly available upon request, the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) ensures that federal agencies operate with transparency. FOIA, however,
does include several exemptions designed to protect certain types of information
from public disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (“Exemption 7(C)”) protects law
enforcement records whose disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” In FCC v. AT&T, Inc., CompTel—a
trade association representing several telecommunications companies—submitted a
FOIA request seeking documents obtained by the government from AT&T during
the course of an FCC investigation. The issue before the Court was whether the
phrase “personal privacy,” as it is used in Exemption 7(C), applies to corporations
like AT&T and not just to individuals. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court
held that corporations do not have “personal privacy” protection under Exemption
7(C) of FOIA.
In August 2004, AT&T reported to the FCC that it might have overcharged
the federal government for services it provided as part of an FCC-administered
program. During the FCC Enforcement Bureau’s investigation of the matter, AT&T
was required to provide the government with various documents. These documents
included responses to interrogatories, invoices, pricing and billing information, and
the names and job descriptions of employees. The FCC concluded that some
documents were in fact exempted from public disclosure. Under 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(4), documents pertaining to billing practices and staff identities were
protected as “trade secrets and commercial or financial information.” The FCC also
concluded, however, that Exemption 7(C)’s “personal privacy” protection was not
applicable to corporations like AT&T.
AT&T sought review in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit
court reversed the FCC’s ruling, holding that FOIA “unambiguously indicates that a
corporation may have a ‘personal privacy’ interest within the meaning of Exemption
7(C).” The circuit court based its holding on the fact that Congress had expressly
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defined “person” to include corporations as well as individuals in 5 U.S.C. § 551(2).
Because the word “person” was the root word of “personal,” Exemption 7(C) must
be interpreted as applicable to corporations. The FCC petitioned the Supreme Court
for review and the Court granted certiorari. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that corporations do not have “personal privacy” for the purposes of
Exemption 7(C).
The Supreme Court’s analysis was one of thorough statutory interpretation.
The Court first addressed AT&T’s argument that Congress’s inclusion of
corporations in the statutory definition of “person” in 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) necessarily
meant that corporations have “personal privacy” protection under Exemption 7(C).
The Court rejected this argument by delineating a substantial difference in meaning
between the words “person” and “personal.”
In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, the Supreme Court
typically gives the term its ordinary meaning. “Personal,” the Court asserted,
ordinarily refers to individuals. The Court observed that “[w]e do not usually speak
of personal characteristics, personal effects, personal correspondence . . . as referring
to corporations or other artificial entities.” In fact, the common usage of the word
“personal” suggests that the word means the exact opposite of business-related.
When interpreting statutory language, the Supreme Court also examines the
context of the language. Relying heavily on Congress’s definition of “person” in 5
U.S.C. § 551(2), AT&T’s argument was that, in a legal context, the word “personal”
refers to individuals and corporations. The Court rejected this argument, finding that
the statutory definition of “person” is not transferable to the term “personal.” Even
though “person” may have a legal definition that differs from its ordinary one,
“personal” does not.
Instead, the Court found that the context of Exemption 7(C) indicates that
Congress intended Exemption 7(C) to apply only to individuals and not to artificial
entities like corporations. When viewed in the context of the other FOIA
exemptions, the meaning of the phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C)
became clear to the Court. The Court first looked at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)
(“Exemption 6”), which protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.” Citing many cases in which it referred to Exemption 6 as involving an
“individual’s right of privacy,” the Court saw no reason to interpret Exemption 7(C),
which contained identical language, any differently. The Court then looked at 5
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U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (“Exemption 4”), which protects “trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” The
Court reasoned that this exemption’s reference to “a person” clearly applied to
corporations because corporations have privileged or confidential information rather
than personally private information. Thus, because Congress chose to mimic the
language of Exemption 6 rather than Exemption 4 in drafting Exemption 7(C),
Congress must have intended Exemption 7(C) to apply only to individuals.
When construing statutory language, the Supreme Court also considers terms
immediately surrounding the language. In this case, the Court found that the
presence of the word “privacy” next to “personal” ensures that Congress did not
intend to give corporations personal privacy protection under Exemption 7(C).
“Personal,” as used in the phrase “personal privacy,” suggests a type of privacy
“evocative of human concerns” unassociated with corporations in any way. Noting
that AT&T failed to cite a single case or statute that expressly acknowledged a
corporation’s “personal privacy,” the Court found that AT&T provided no sound
reason for the Court to disregard the ordinary meaning of the phrase “personal
privacy.”
The Court bolstered its holding by noting that the federal government itself
had long interpreted the phrase “personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) to pertain to
individuals and not to corporations. The Court identified a memorandum, issued by
the Attorney General soon after Congress added Exemption 7(C) to FOIA in 1974,
declaring that Exemption 7(C) “pertains to the privacy interests of individuals” and
“does not seem applicable to corporations or other entities.” By declining to extend
Exemption 7(C) protection to corporations, the Court thus affirmed the federal
government’s long-standing interpretation of Exemption 7(C).
The Court’s decision in FCC v. AT&T serves as a reminder to corporations
that FOIA’s exemptions do not grant them blanket protection from information
requests submitted by competitors to the government. Considering that the only
reason that AT&T’s documents ever became vulnerable to public disclosure was
because of a government investigation, the real lesson to corporations and their
attorneys may simply be to stay out of trouble with the government. Attorneys
should realize that a government investigation of a corporate client is not only
distracting and expensive, but also exposes many of that client’s documents to
potential public disclosure. While this case prompts transactional attorneys to
recognize the limitations of FOIA’s exemptions, it also highlights the usefulness of
Exemption 4. The FCC relied on this exemption to protect AT&T’s most sensitive
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information, such as cost and pricing data, billing information, and staff identities.
Thus, Exemption 4 represents the most robust safeguard available to corporations
opposing FOIA requests.
________

A legally valid partnership may result if all relevant evidence shows clear and
convincing proof of a partnership in fact, even if the actual intent of the
parties is unclear or unknown. Swecker v. Swecker, No. E2010-00046-COA-RC-CV,
2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 25, 2011 WL 303263 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2011)
By Evan Daniels
In Swecker v. Swecker, the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered whether a
father-son business venture formed a legally valid partnership despite never entering
into a formal partnership agreement. In upholding the trial court’s determination
that a partnership existed, the court specifically noted that the actual intent of parties
is “not essential” in forming a business partnership, that “[doing] the things which
constitute a partnership” is the true test of whether a partnership exists, and that the
parties need not understand the legal ramifications of partnership in order to form
one. As a result, the court found that the evidence before them eliminated “any
serious doubt” that a partnership actually existed.
In the mid 1970s, Richard Swecker began helping his father, Joseph Swecker,
run a dairy that Joseph owned and operated on family-owned land. In 1986, Richard
and his wife moved into a home owned by Joseph that was located on the property,
and, starting in 1997, Richard assumed greater responsibilities with the dairy. Shortly
thereafter, Richard and Joseph opened a joint bank account “for the purposes of
managing the income and expenses of the farming operations.” Additionally,
approximately 260 head of cattle were registered jointly to them, and checks issued
to the diary were made payable to both men with regular deposits made into the joint
bank account.
Joseph passed away on June 25, 2008, and Richard continued to operate the
dairy, which he claimed continued to produce profits. Shortly after Joseph’s death,
Richard sued Steven Swecker and Joseph G. Swecker, representatives of Joseph
Swecker’s estate, for failure to provide him with a share of the dairy’s profits, which
Richard claimed Steven and Joseph G. had collected. Moreover, Richard asked the
court to declare that a partnership existed between him and his father in the
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operation of the dairy. Steven and Joseph G. counterclaimed, arguing that Richard
received a set monthly salary that made him merely an employee and not a partner.
The counterclaim also argued that Richard should reimburse the estate for alleged
mismanagement of the dairy’s business operations.
After trial, a memorandum opinion of the trial court held that the evidence
clearly and convincingly established that Richard and his father worked as co-owners
of the dairy and that the arrangement formed a partnership. Therefore, the trial
court resolved that Joseph’s death had dissolved the partnership and that the parties
should liquidate the dairy’s business assets, as the estate had started to do prior to
trial. Moreover, the trial court ordered that Richard receive a fifty percent share of
the profits gained from selling the dairy’s assets.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court, relying, in particular, upon the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Bass v.
Bass and a Tennessee Court of Appeals decision in Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. v.
Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc. In Bass, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted three important
factors to work through in order to determine whether a legal partnership exists.
Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991). First, the intention of the parties to
form a partnership is “not essential” in establishing one. Second, “the intent to do
the things which constitute a partnership” is what actually establishes a legally valid
partnership. Finally, the parties themselves need not be aware of the legal
consequences surrounding a partnership in order to form one. Similarly, in Messer
Griesheim Industries, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a partnership forms
when money, assets, labor, or skills are shared with the intent that profits resulting
from these shared resources will likewise be shared. Also, the burden of proof to
show that a partnership exists rests with the party who wishes the partnership to be
established. Messer Griesheim Industries, Inc. v. Cryotech of Kingsport, Inc., 45
S.W.3d 588, 605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
Using this line of reasoning, the court of appeals affirmed that Richard met
the burden of proof by showing a partnership existed. In particular, the court
explained that a legally valid partnership could be implied, even without an express
agreement, as a result of their shared property, labor, skill, experience, and money.
In particular, the court dismissed the objections of Joseph Swecker’s estate that
Richard was merely an employee, stating that just because Richard was compensated
a certain amount every month did not necessarily prove that Joseph did not intend to
share the dairy’s profits with Richard. Furthermore, the court of appeals determined
that the trial court correctly found the evidence to be clear and convincing that a
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partnership existed as a result of the shared bank account, checks issued in both
names for the dairy’s goods, and jointly registered cattle.
Swecker serves as a reminder that courts will often look to the substance of
non-contractual agreements rather than their form. While Joseph seemingly never
indicated whether he considered Richard a partner, the combination of their labor
and resources sufficiently established Richard’s right to half the venture’s assets.
This speaks to the importance of clarifying each party’s disposition towards the other
when engaging in a joint-venture. That is to say, if a business owner does not want
to risk giving employees or partners a greater share of profits beyond a set salary or a
certain percentage of profits, the business owner should seek to protect the business
through explicit statements in written agreements defining the relationship each
employee and partner has to the venture. Likewise, the responsibilities entrusted to
such subordinate parties should match the expressed form of the agreement reached.
Alternatively, parties seeking to establish greater shares of profit in partnerships
ought to seek explicit agreements outlining the terms of the arrangement.
While the significant lesson of Swecker reinforces the notion that whatever
parties can do to express their intent will likely prevent most major disagreements,
the case also illustrates the vagueness of the law in Tennessee. Even though
Tennessee law defines “partnership” as “an association of two (2) or more persons
to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit,” T.C.A. § 61-1-202, Bass, Messer
Griesheim Industries, and now Swecker all seem to suggest that a “co-owner” could
potentially be an individual or group of individuals who do not necessarily begin
their association with a business as “co-owners” at all. While the intent of an
employer in hiring an employee seems clear enough, Swecker and the other cases
suggest the totality of circumstances surrounding what the employee actually does
and accomplishes for the employer may be influential enough to confer partnership
status. Swecker itself hints at this possibility. The counterclaim filed by Steven and
Joseph G. Swecker hinged on the argument that Richard was an employee of the
dairy and not a partner. While the court obviously found this representation of the
facts unconvincing, a similar fact pattern might generate an even closer case.
Ultimately, Swecker emphasizes the point that business ventures best protect
themselves through written agreements rather than by relying on the judicial system
to interpret the totality of circumstances. Even though Swecker might cast doubt on
how “co-owner” is defined in Tennessee law, such vagueness can be avoided with
clearly delineated conditions outlining the terms of employment, partnership, and
profit sharing. Nevertheless, business ventures seeking to avoid the possibility of a
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court-imposed partnership for minor stakeholders should carefully consider the
responsibilities of employees and the access to business resources available to such
individuals. In doing so, such arrangements should make abundantly clear to any
potential third party observer that the substance of a given business arrangement
matches the form in which it appears.
________

The filing of a certificate of limited partnership does not ensure recognition of
that partnership where the party alleging partnership does not partake in the
business activities of the alleged partnership. Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P., 337 S.W.3d
792 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
By Matthew Delinko
A partnership is two or more people acting as co-owners of a business,
which is governed by a written or oral partnership agreement. If the alleged
partnership is acting without a partnership agreement, the court may imply a
partnership. Further, the filing of a certificate of limited partnership is not sufficient
to establish a partnership without the satisfaction of the other statutory
requirements. In Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P., the Tennessee Court of Appeals decided the
issue of whether the Appellee entities, Orangeco Limited Partnership (“Orangeco”)
and Whiteco Limited Partnership (“Whiteco”), were partnerships under Tennessee
law and, therefore, were liable under the agreements entered into with Sherry Tanner
(“Ms. Tanner”). The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that Orangeco and Whiteco
were not partnerships because “there was not clear and convincing evidence in the
record from which to infer the existence of a partnership between Norman . . . and
any of his children.”
Tanner v. Whiteco involved two parties entering into a general partnership
agreement in order to develop and market residential real property, as well as a trust
agreement for another piece of property. On July 16, 1998, Norman Vann Thomas,
Sr. (“Norman”) filed Orangeco’s certificate of limited partnership with the
Tennessee Secretary of State. After the filing, Norman instructed one of his four
children, Catherine Maness (“Catherine”), to place the Orangeco certificate in the
filing cabinet because “he was doing estate planning and . . . she and her siblings had
an interest in the limited partnership.” On December 30, 1998, Norman filed
Whiteco’s certificate of limited partnership with the Tennessee Secretary of State and
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asked Catherine to file the Whiteco certificate in the filing cabinet, as well. He also
told Catherine that she and her siblings “had an interest in Whiteco.”
On July 17, 1998, Ms. Tanner, under the name of Destin Partnership, entered
into a general partnership agreement with Orangeco. The agreement specified that
Ms. Tanner was to receive a percentage of the income Orangeco received from the
sale of real property. On June 29, 1999, Ms. Tanner entered into a trust agreement
with Whiteco, which gave both parties a fifty percent interest in Brownville-St. Elmo
Shopping Center, L.L.C.
Norman died on July 10, 2007. After his death a check was written to Steve
Vesco, an escrow agent for Orangeco, to cover the funeral expenses. All four of the
Thomas children signed a receipt and waiver acknowledging that they were interest
holders in Orangeco and Whiteco and that the funds would be used to cover the
funeral expenses.
Ms. Tanner brought suit because Orangeco and Whiteco failed to perform
under the Destin Partnership Agreement. Ms. Tanner claimed that she was owed
over one million dollars but had received less than one hundred thousand dollars.
A “partnership” is defined in T.C.A. § 61-1-101(6) as “[an] association of two
(2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business or other undertaking for
profit . . . .” These persons must have “entered into a business relationship for
profit, combining their property, labor, skill, experience, or money.” According to
the Tennessee Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the formation of a limited
partnership requires three actions. First, T.C.A. § 61-2-201 requires “the filing of a
properly executed certificate with the Secretary of State.” Secondly, pursuant to
T.C.A. § 61-2-101(8), there must be one or more general partners as well as one or
more limited partners. Third and finally, there must be an agreement between the
parties. The agreement between the parties can be written or oral, and “where
neither exists, a court may imply the existence of a partnership.” In order to imply
the existence of a partnership agreement, there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the parties intended to entered into a partnership. Further, the burden
of proof is on the party alleging the existence of the partnership.
The trial court found that neither Orangeco nor Whiteco were limited
partnerships under Tennessee law and that Norman was the only partner in either
alleged partnership. On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that “there was
not clear and convincing evidence in the record from which to infer the existence of
a partnership between Norman . . . and any of his children.” The court refused to
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infer a partnership because Ms. Tanner presented no evidence of a written or oral
partnership agreement for Orangeco or Whiteco. The court also considered and
rejected the three reasons Ms. Tanner cited as justification for inferring a partnership
agreement: (1) the filing of the certificates of limited partnership; (2) Catherine
receiving the certificates from her father, filing them, and being told she had an
“interest” in Orangeco and Whiteco; and (3) the children signing the receipt and
waiver identifying an interest in Orangeco and Whiteco.
The court reasoned that the organization under the Tennessee Limited
Partnership Act does not result in the formation of a partnership. Two parties are
required to form a partnership, and, according to the trial court’s findings, Norman
was the only person involved in Orangeco and Whiteco. As to Catherine receiving
and filing the certificates, the court decided that giving the certificates to her to file
was not sufficient to establish a partnership. Also, Norman telling Catherine that she
and her siblings had an “interest” in Orangeco and Whiteco was also insufficient to
establish a partnership. The court explained that the children did not “combine their
property, skills, experience, or money with their father’s” from the time of filing the
certificates to his death. Further, concerning the signing of a receipt and
acknowledgement, the court stated that the children’s actions after their father’s
death did not create a partnership. The court reasoned that an interest holder is not
a partner and also that the children’s interests in the alleged partnerships were merely
due to their status as beneficiaries of his estate.
Tanner v. Whiteco stands for the idea that, although an alleged partnership may
seem to have the requisite number of partners, the lack of an agreement between
those parties or the lack of those parties carrying on as co-owners may fail to meet
the standards of a “partnership” in Tennessee. To avoid similar problems, it is
important to discover whether the alleged partnership has a written or oral
partnership agreement before doing business with that alleged partnership. Doing so
will avoid litigation on the issue of whether or not the business is a partnership and
will not leave the decision to the court to imply the existence of a partnership. Such
litigation might be significant as clear and convincing evidence is required to
establish an implied partnership, and the burden of proof is on the party alleging the
partnership. Finally, it is also important to confirm that there are at least two parties
participating in the partnership. If not, the filing of a certificate of limited
partnership is not enough to establish a partnership.
________
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CONTRACTS
Tennessee courts will interpret unambiguous contracts as complete
representations of the contracting parties’ intentions and hold each party to
their obligations as defined by the terms, regardless of any discrepancy
between the plain language of the contract and the parties’ actual objectives.
Collateral Plus, LLC v. Max Well Med., Inc., No. M2010-00638-COA-R3-CV, 2011
Tenn. App. LEXIS 150, 2011 WL 1167192 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2011).
By Trevor McElhaney
In Tennessee, when a court interprets and finds a contract to be
unambiguous and unequivocal, the contract will be “interpreted according to its plain
terms as written, and the language used taken in its ‘plain, ordinary, and popular
sense.’” In Collateral Plus, LLC v. Max Well Med., Inc., the Tennessee Court of
Appeals addressed whether a placement fee provision within a loan management
agreement is enforceable when the agreement states unequivocally that it terminates
upon the repayment of the underlying loan. The court held that any requirement not
explicitly written as a condition precedent to the termination of the contract would
not be enforced. In order to fully appreciate the court’s holding, it is necessary to
examine the specific factual nature of the case.
Collateral Plus, LLC (“Collateral”) is a business that provides financing to
early stage companies that, due to uncertainty, have trouble obtaining traditional
bank financing. Max Well Medical, Inc. (“Max Well”) was in financial trouble and
sought help from Collateral to obtain financing. Collateral entered into a Loan
Management Agreement (“LMA”) with Max Well whereby Collateral provided
letters of credit and other credit enhancements and agreed to act as paying agent for
a line of credit from SunTrust Bank up to an amount of $4,500,000. In return, Max
Well agreed to pay, among other fees, “a placement fee of $900,000, payable upon a
change of control of [Max Well], sale of [Max Well], or the acquisition of [Max
Well’s] assets.” The LMA specifically defined the “Term” of the agreement in
relevant part as “the date first written above and shall continue in full force and
effect until such time as [Max Well’s] indebtedness with respect to the Loan has been
paid in full.” The “Term” section of the LMA further provided that if and when
Max Well sold its assets, Collateral would work to refinance the balance of the loan
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for an additional eleven months. In return, Max Well agreed to pay several
additional fees, including the placement fee due on the sale of Max Well’s assets.
When the agreement was executed, both parties were under the impression
that Max Well would execute a put/call option, selling its assets to a separate
company it was dealing with, given certain financial performance targets were met.
If the proposed put/call option and subsequent sale of the company did not work
out, both parties assumed that Max Well would simply go out of business.
However, Fresenius Medical Care North America (“Fresenius”) acquired the
holder of the put/call agreement, and, along with Specialty Care Services Group
(“SCSG”), acquired thirty-one percent of Max Well’s outstanding stock. As part of
the deal, Fresenius and SCSG guaranteed $4 million of Max Well’s debt. With this
guarantee, Max Well paid off the balance of the $4.5 million line of credit that was
subject to the LMA between them and Collateral. Approximately one year later,
Fresenius acquired the remaining sixty-nine percent of Max Well’s outstanding stock.
At that time, Collateral demanded the placement fee of $900,000 from Max Well.
Max Well declined to pay the fee on grounds that the LMA had terminated upon
repayment of the outstanding balance of its $4,500,000 line of credit and, as a result,
terminated any obligation to pay the replacement fee.
Collateral filed suit against Max Well for payment of the $900,000 placement
fee. Max Well moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the
LMA made the payment of the placement fee conditional upon the survival of the
LMA. Collateral filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that Max Well
owed the $900,000 placement fee to Collateral at the execution of the LMA.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Collateral, holding that
the credit enhancements were a “significant benefit” to Max Well and that, in
exchange for the benefit, Max Well promised to pay the $900,000 placement fee set
forth expressly in the agreement. Further, the trial court ruled that, in order to keep
with the plain language of the agreement, Collateral earned the placement fee upon
the execution of the LMA through the guaranties and other credit enhancements
that allowed Max Well to obtain the $4.5 million loan from SunTrust Bank. Max
Well duly filed a Notice of Appeal contending, in relevant part, that the trial court
erred in its conclusion that the placement fee survived the termination of the LMA
and erred in granting Collateral’s motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Collateral and held that Max Well’s motion for
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summary judgment should have been upheld. In its ruling, the court stated that the
purpose of interpreting a contract is to “ascertain and give effect to the contracting
parties’ intentions, and where the parties have reduced their agreement to writing,
[interpret] their intentions [as] reflected in the contract itself.”
First, the court determined that the primary issue was based on the
interpretation of the language used in the LMA. It concluded that Collateral and
Max Well were “sophisticated parties, engaged in a specialized arrangement, and
represented by counsel throughout the contracting process.” Therefore, the court
refused to interpret the contract as to what the parties may have intended to say.
Rather, the court noted that the parties agreed in their memoranda and in open court
that the LMA was unambiguous. Unlike the trial court, the court of appeals also
found the LMA to be unambiguous and, therefore, would interpret the language
used in its “plain, ordinary, and popular sense.” Further, in looking at the “Term”
section of the LMA, the court noted that the LMA clearly provides that, if the LMA
were renewed upon the sale of Max Well’s assets, Max Well would still be required to
pay the placement fee of $900,000. In light of this, there was no reason to include
specific language in the LMA obligating Max Well to pay the placement fee upon
renewal of the LMA if the parties’ original intention was for the placement fee to
survive the termination of the LMA.
Second, the court was not persuaded by Collateral’s argument that the court
should imply a reasonable time for performance because the LMA did not specify a
specific time. Although the court agreed with Collateral’s argument that a
“reasonableness” requirement is implied in all contracts, it held that the
“reasonableness” implication did not apply to the LMA, because the LMA
specifically stated the conditions by which the placement fee would be owed by Max
Well. Once again, because the LMA was unambiguous, the court reasoned that it
would not look past the four corners of the contract in its interpretation.
Neglecting to specifically state within the LMA that Max Well owed the
placement fee under any and all circumstances proved to be a costly mistake for
Collateral. The Tennessee Court of Appeal’s decision, granting summary judgment
for Max Well, serves as a reminder to all transactional attorneys in the state of
Tennessee that, when drafting an agreement between two parties, any provisions that
a party expects to be performed should always be reduced to writing in clear and
unambiguous language. Further, this case proves that simple things, such as the
repetition of a provision, will be taken into account in interpreting the parties’
intentions. To be certain that the parties’ intentions will be enforced, the language
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should be so clear that the contract could not be interpreted any other way.
Therefore, anything that is discussed, anticipated, or expected between two parties
should be in plain view for the court to interpret. From the ruling in Collateral Plus,
LLC v. Max Well Medical Inc., it is clear that Tennessee courts “will not make a new
contract for parties who have spoken for themselves . . . and will not relieve parties
of their contractual obligations simply because these obligations later prove to be
burdensome or unwise.” Therefore, Tennessee attorneys should always examine
their clients’ contracts with great specificity and detail in order to ensure that every
provision of their clients’ contracts will be upheld.
________
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INSURANCE
An insured can recover from his agent on a failure to procure claim when an
obtained policy later becomes void because of the agent’s own acts, even
when the insured separately settles with the insurance company. Morrison v.
Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417 (Tenn. 2011).
By Annie Ellis
A relationship between an insured and his agent may be helpful to the former
when selecting insurance coverage. When the insured places full trust in the agent,
he expects his desired results, placing full confidence in the agent’s expertise and
knowledge of the ins and outs of the complicated field of insurance coverage. When
an agent fails to obtain this insurance and an incident occurs that the expected policy
would have covered, the insured can rightfully recover from the agent based on a
failure to procure claim. Further, when an agent obtains coverage that is drastically
different than what the insured bargained for, a cause of action for failure to procure
might still exist because the law recognizes that an insured has reasonable
expectations that the agent will properly deliver what was agreed upon. In Morrison v.
Allen, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the degree of liability that follows an
agent when the insurance policy he obtains is successfully contested due to his own
acts or omissions and whether any recovery is limited by an insured’s own failure to
read the insurance application that was prepared by the agent.
Howard Morrison (“Mr. Morrison”) purchased a $300,000 term life
insurance policy in 2000 from First Colony, and his wife, Kristen Scott Morrison
(“Mrs. Morrison”), was the beneficiary. The policy contained a two-year
incontestability clause, which meant that First Colony could not deny coverage to the
Morrisons because of any misrepresentations in the application after the Morrisons
held the policy for two years. This clause took effect just before 2002, when Mr.
Morrison was convicted of driving while impaired.
After developing a social relationship with Paul Allen and Jody Roberts
(“Defendants”), both certified financial planners with Wiley Brothers, the Morrisons
decided to pursue alternative life insurance coverage. After discussing their
expectations with the Defendants, the Defendants recommended two policies with
American General that had lower premiums than the Morrisons’ then-existing policy.
The Morrisons never specifically requested that the replacement policy be
incontestable, and there was no evidence that the Defendants explained that this new
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policy was contestable for two years, unlike Mr. Morrison’s then-existing policy that
had reached the incontestability stage. After collecting limited information at an
initial meeting, one of the Defendants contacted Mrs. Morrison to ask for her
driver’s license number and her son’s social security number, but the Defendants
made no further inquires before sending the Morrisons the completed insurance
applications, with sticky-notes indicating where the Morrisons needed to sign the
documents.
The Morrisons trusted that the Defendants had taken care of everything, so
they signed where directed, without reading the applications. The Morrisons did not
notice a “no” answer to a question inquiring about any convictions for driving under
the influence of alcohol. Still, the Morrisons signed that they had read and
understood the policy. In addition, Mr. Morrison signed a separate document stating
that he understood that he should not cancel his prior-existing policy until the new
policy was issued. When an American General nurse traveled to the Morrison home
to collect medical information and asked Mr. Morrison if he had any driving
violations, he answered “yes.”
Two months after the policies took effect, Mr. Morrison died unexpectedly
from injuries sustained in a car accident. Mrs. Morrison, as the beneficiary, filed a
claim for coverage with American General, who denied the claim. American General
reasoned that Mr. Morrison had made a misrepresentation because the application
answered “no” to the question about driving violations, even though he had candidly
told the nurse that his driver’s license had been suspended. American General had
standing to deny the claim because the alleged misrepresentation occurred within the
two-year contestability period.
Mrs. Morrison sued American General, the Defendants, and Wiley Brothers,
alleging breach of the $1,000,000 life insurance contract, violation of the Tennessee
Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), and general negligence. Mrs. Morrison settled
her claim with American General for $900,000. After this settlement, Mrs. Morrison
focused on recovering from the Defendants based on a breach of contract theory for
failure to procure an enforceable insurance policy, a tort theory of negligence, and a
claim under the TCPA for reckless practices.
The trial court awarded Mrs. Morrison the full $1,000,000, plus interest, for a
breach of contract for failing to procure an enforceable policy, $300,000 for the
Defendant’s negligence in allowing the Morrisons to cancel the prior First Colony
policy, and another $300,000 for willful and knowing recklessness, in violation of the
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TCPA. The trial court did not use Mrs. Morrison’s settlement with American
General to offset the substantial amount. The court of appeals affirmed in most
aspects but disagreed with the trial court’s decision not to discount the judgment
based on Mrs. Morrison’s prior settlement.
The Tennessee Supreme Court began its analysis by definitively stating the
necessary elements for a failure to procure claim: (1) an undertaking by the agent to
procure coverage; (2) the agent’s failure to use reasonable diligence; and (3) the client
was warranted in assuming she was properly insured. The court reasoned that, if the
agent is at fault when a policy is successfully contested by the insurance company,
the insured does not receive the benefit of her bargain and is entitled to recovery.
The court concluded that there is no distinction between the agent’s total failure to
procure and the procurement of coverage that later becomes void by fault of the
agent.
The court agreed that the Defendants had a casual attitude and were not
attentive to detail when collecting information before searching for an appropriate
policy. The Defendants described some incorrect answers on the applications as
honest mistakes, even when there was clear evidence that the Defendants knew the
answers were incorrect. For example, the Defendants had watched the Morrisons
smoke cigars, yet indicated that they did not smoke on the application. The court
held firm that a client should be able to trust that an agent will ask the important
questions and accurately record the answers so that a policy cannot be successfully
contested later. The court reasoned that agents serve as insurance professionals and
should be held to high standards.
The court found it insignificant that the Morrisons failed to read the
applications. The Morrisons hired the Defendants to purchase a policy suitable to
their needs, and the failure to procure an enforceable policy was a breach of their
employment contract. The Morrisons had relied on the expertise of the Defendants
in assuming they were properly insured after signing where directed and completing
a medical examination. The failure of the Morrisons to specifically contract for an
uncontestable policy was irrelevant because insurance obtained and later voided at
the fault of the agent has the same value as no insurance at all. The court affirmed
the lower court’s decisions to hold the Defendants liable for failure to procure.
As to the prior settlement, the majority found that American General’s
liability did not extinguish the Defendants’ liability and reversed the appellate court’s
decision to give credit to Mrs. Morrison’s prior settlement. Dissenting justices
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declined to accept this conclusion, reasoning that this would place Mrs. Morrison in
a better position than policy coverage of $1,000,000, contrary to the fundamental
purpose of contract law.
On the theory of negligence, the court found that the elements were not met
because a separate document explained that the prior policy should only be canceled
with caution. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court’s award of $300,000 for
negligent practice. Accordingly, it reversed the doubling of this award based on
reckless practice violations of the TCPA.
The Tennessee Supreme Court made it more difficult for insurance agents to
absolve themselves from liability when a client signs that he read and understood an
insurance policy. An employment contract was created between the Morrisons and
the Defendants, establishing a heightened duty of care. Insurance agents must
understand that they are liable when they fail to satisfy the needs of the insured, even
with the insured’s signature of understanding. Tennessee transactional attorneys
must advise insurance agents that submitting an inadequate insurance policy is the
equivalent of failing to obtain a policy at all. Further, as Morrison explains, Tennessee
agents cannot expect to find sympathy from the court when a plaintiff independently
recovers from an insurance company.
________
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REAL ESTATE
When entering into contracts, corporate officers and other company
representatives must expressly and unambiguously define themselves as such
in order to shield themselves from personal liability. Associated Shopping Ctr.
Props., Ltd. v. Hodge, No. M2010-00039-COA-R3-CV, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 138,
2011 WL 1025753 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2011).
By Tommy Gossett
It is a well-established rule of law that when interpreting contracts one must
ascertain the intent of the parties involved by looking at the contract as a whole and
giving legal effect to that intention. Further, when a person associated with a
particular company signs a contract, it often must be determined by the contract’s
language whether he or she intended to do so as an individual or in his or her
representative capacity with the company. In Associated Shopping Ctr. Props., Ltd. v.
Hodge, the Tennessee Court of Appeals discussed whether the individual defendant,
Hodge, was an additional lessee and, thus, was personally liable for the debt owed
under the lease agreement based on contract interpretation and Hodge’s intent.
In Associated Shopping Ctr. Props., Ltd. v. Hodge, Associated Shopping Center
Properties, LTD (“Associated”) entered into a lease agreement with Décor Fabrics,
LLC (“Décor”) for the use of property to operate a business under the name
“Material Things.” Décor was owned and operated by three individuals: Tracy
Hanchey, Décor’s President; Jacqueline Westra, Décor’s Vice-President; and Edward
Hodge, Décor’s Chief Financial Officer. The lease itself consisted of two individual
sections: (1) a preprinted form agreement that contained several blank lines where
additional information could be written in by hand, such as the identity of the
leasee(s), the demised premises, or the lease term and (2) a typed addendum entitled
“Attachment A.” The single “Lessee” explicitly identified in the preprinted form
lease was “Décor Fabrics, LLC,” which was handwritten in the blank. Yet, “See
Attachment A” was also handwritten immediately next to Décor Fabrics, LLC. “See
Attachment A” was similarly handwritten in Paragraph 1.0 titled “Lease Term” and
Paragraph 2.0 titled “Minimum Rental and Cost of Living Adjustment.” The
Paragraphs were crossed through, and the words “See Attachment A” were written
over the crossed-through paragraphs.
The first paragraph of Attachment A stated that “Lessee shall be Décor
Fabrics, LLC, with the following members also as individual Lessees: A. Tracy
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Hanchey, member and President. B. Jacqueline Westra, member and Vice President.
C. Edward Hodge, member and CFO.” In addition, Attachment A stated significant
information such as the lease term, annual rent calculation, and improvements and
renovations Associated agreed to complete before Décor moved into the space.
Also, a paragraph on the first page of the lease stated that “any attachment to this
Lease Agreement shall be a part of this agreement.” The signatures of Mr. Hodge
and Ms. Hanchey followed only by their birthdays and social security numbers
appeared on the Lease on the signature line provided for the Lessee. Ms. Westra’s
signature appeared on a separate piece of paper indicating that she had read and
agreed to the terms of the lease. There is absolutely no indication that Mr. Hodge’s,
Ms. Hanchey’s, or Ms. Westra’s signatures were made in their representative capacity.
Due to unforeseen delays, the beginning date of the lease term had to be
pushed back. Therefore, Mr. Smith, the Management Agent for Associated, mailed a
letter to Ms. Hanchey’s attention at Décor’s address suggesting that the parties
modify the start date to reflect when Décor actually moved into the space. After
receiving the letter, Mr. Smith and Ms. Hanchey executed “Lease Amendment #2,”
which provided that the previous letter would be considered Lease Amendment #1.
Lease Amendment #2 also stated that the later date had been agreed upon as the
official start date and that “all other terms and conditions in the original lease remain
the same.”
Décor experienced financial problems three months into the lease and failed
to make the rent payments when due. As a result, Associated mailed a notice of
default to all members of Décor, Ms. Hanchey, Ms. Westra, and Mr. Hodge, stating
that they owed a total of $44,016.58 in unpaid rent. Associated sent subsequent
notices of default and finally determined that Ms. Hanchey, Ms. Westra, and Mr.
Hodge would be individually responsible for the unpaid rent, a deficiency for the
remainder of the lease term, and other additional expenses. Consequently,
Associated filed suit against Ms. Hanchey, Ms. Westra, and Mr. Hodge in their
individual capacities, claiming that they were additional lessees and thus personally
liable under the terms of the lease. Ms. Hanchey never filed an answer, so a default
judgment was entered against her. However, Ms. Westra and Mr. Hodge each filed
an answer arguing they were not personally liable for breach of the lease because
Décor was the sole lessee and because they merely signed the lease in their
representative capacities as officers of Décor. Ultimately, the trial court held the
provisions of the lease were unambiguous and named Mr. Hodge and Ms. Westra as
additional, individual lessees, thus making them personally liable for the amount
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owed. Both Ms. Westra and Mr. Hodge filed an appeal; however, Ms. Westra settled
before the court heard the case. Mr. Hodge contended the following: (1) he was not
an individual lessee, (2) the parties never intended him to be an individual lessee, and
(3) his only involvement with the lease was as a member and CFO of Décor.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals first held that the provisions of
the contract, when read in harmony with each other, were unambiguous and must be
interpreted as written, rather than according to the unexpressed intention of the
parties. Tennessee case law states that a contract is ambiguous only when it is of
uncertain meaning and may fairly be understood in more ways than one. Therefore,
the mere use of the singular form of “lessee” in the preprinted form agreement
without language expressly excluding the possibility of additional leases is not
sufficient to create a conflict with the express identification of additional lessees in
Attachment A. The court’s holding is solidified by the fact that the paragraph
identifying the Lessee expressly instructed the parties to “See Attachment A,” which
listed additional lessees acknowledged by name. Likewise, the court found that the
paragraph clearly labeled “Attachments” and including the language “any
attachments to this Lease Agreement shall be a part of this agreement . . . as agreed
between Lessor and Lessee at the time of signing of the agreement” was
unambiguous proof of the parties’ deliberate intent to include the attachment stating
Mr. Hodge’s name as individual lessee. “See Attachment A” clearly appeared three
times on the first page of the lease and affected three significant provisions. As such,
the court held that Mr. Hodge must have read Attachment A in order to understand
the significant provisions. The court fully agreed with the trial court’s ruling that
Attachment A was as clear as it could be in specifically identifying Mr. Hodge as an
additional, individual lessee.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals next held that, because the contract clearly
stated that Mr. Hodge was also an “individual lessee” and because his signature on
the Lease was followed by his personal social security number, Mr. Hodge was
personally liable for the debt owed to Associated and was not acting in his
representative capacity. Tennessee law consistently rules that a person’s signature,
without limiting or descriptive words before or after it, is the universal method of
signing a contract to assume a personal obligation. Also, on the last page of the preprinted form lease, Associated is identified as Lessor with the notation of “C.
Gregory Smith, Jr. Management Agent” appearing below the signature line. The
court held, based on that evidence, that unlike Mr. Smith, who signed as
Management Agent of Associated, Mr. Hodge did not make any notation that he
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signed the lease in his representative capacity. Therefore, the lease, when considered
as a whole, expressly and unambiguously identified Mr. Hodge as an additional
lessee, bound in his individual capacity.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals’ decision to uphold the rule of law that the
court must interpret a contract as a whole as written, rather than according to the
unexpressed intention of the parties, shows that, when feasible, the court will hold
that the parties are bound by the terms expressly within the contract. Therefore,
whether a person intended to sign a contract in his or her individual or representative
capacity will be determined from the contract’s express language. When drafting a
contract, an attorney should include words limiting the personal obligation of the
client where possible throughout the contract. Additionally, when an individual signs
a contract, an attorney should always read the entire contract and not allow the client
to sign his or her personal name unless the client intends to be bound by all
provisions or clauses contained anywhere within the contract. Further, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals’ holding that Mr. Hodge was an individual lessee,
signing the contract in his individual capacity, reinforces that a court will not look
past the contract itself and dabble in the subjective intent of individual parties.
Today’s attorney must understand that terms within a contract will be strictly
enforced. Moreover, when drafting a contract, an attorney should clearly denote
limiting or descriptive words, before or after the client’s signature, to clearly avoid
personal obligation. Attorneys should also verbally warn a client that when signing a
contract on behalf of a corporation or business, his or her signature should always be
followed by words denoting the officer’s representative capacity so that the signature
will bind only the company.
________
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SECURITIES
A claim for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule
10b-5 requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s representation or
omission materially affected the “total mix” of information made available to
a reasonable investor. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
By Taylor Wirth
It is understood that a corporation must communicate both positive and
negative information regarding its financial security with its shareholders. A
company violates both Security Exchange Commission regulations and federal law
by making or omitting material facts relating to the purchase or sale of its securities.
What constitutes “material,” however, remains a source of ambiguity. In Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, the Supreme Court held that no single factor is dispositive
in determining the materiality of a corporation’s representations; rather, the “total
mix” of information available to a reasonable investor must be considered.
In Matrixx, the respondents filed a class action against Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. (“Matrixx”), the pharmaceutical manufacturer of Zicam cold products. The
plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the drug company made misleading statements
regarding the safety of its cornerstone product, Zicam Cold Remedy (“Zicam”),
which constituted 70% of the company’s profits. That product’s main ingredient,
zinc gluconate, was reportedly the cause of severe side effects, including loss of smell
or anosmia.
Beginning in 1999, Matrixx received complaints from both physicians and
consumers regarding the safety of Zicam, specifically linking the use of zinc to
anosmia. Three years later, a research and development executive at Matrixx
corresponded with a physician who alerted the company to several studies illustrating
zinc’s harmful effect on a consumer’s sense of smell. In 2003, despite Matrixx’s
protest, the American Rhinologic Society hosted a presentation, “Zicam Induced
Anosmia,” which offered empirical evidence of eleven consumers experiencing a loss
of smell after taking the cold remedy. That same year, a product liability lawsuit
against Matrixx was filed, alleging that Zicam was the cause of anosmia. Eventually,
four lawsuits against Matrixx would be filed.
Despite an accumulation of evidence that Zicam was unsafe, Matrixx made
contradictory public statements, maintaining that its revenues would rise 50% to
80% and earnings per share could increase by as much as 38%. During this time, the
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manufacturer failed to disclose to the SEC that two product liability lawsuits had
been filed against it, representing the possibility of a “material adverse effect” on the
product’s success. In response to a news story about Zicam usage and anosmia,
Matrixx issued a press release dismissing the consumer complaints and downplaying
negative health reports. After stock prices fell, Matrixx vowed to conduct tests on its
product in relation to onset of anosmia.
Plaintiffs filed a class action suit, alleging that Matrixx violated § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. The rule prohibits manipulative or
deceptive securities transactions and requires a plaintiff to prove the following
elements: (1) the defendant made a material statement or omission; (2) scienter; (3)
an association between defendant’s misrepresentation and plaintiff’s security
transaction; (4) plaintiff’s reliance upon defendant’s misrepresentation; (5) economic
loss; and (6) loss causation.
In the district court, Matrixx successfully moved to dismiss the complaint on
grounds that the plaintiffs had insufficiently pled the elements of materiality and
scienter. The court held that the plaintiffs did not provide significant evidence
linking Zicam with loss of smell; therefore, the plaintiffs provided insufficient proof
of Matrixx’s intent to defraud. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
stating that the district court erred by requiring a showing of significant statistical
evidence. Rather, the materiality of a statement “requires delicate assessments of the
inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him.” Thus, the appellate court found that the
plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently linked Matrixx’s product with loss of smell. The
court held on appeal that Matrixx’s conduct after learning of negative reports and
subsequently withholding information indicated a sufficient showing of its intention
to defraud consumers.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The element of materiality requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant’s act or omission would be considered material by a
reasonable investor upon consideration of a “total mix” of the facts. Rejecting
Matrixx’s “bright-line rule” that an adverse event relating to its product is proven
only with proof of significant statistical evidence, the Court instead opined that “the
source, content, and context” of the information must be assessed, and that no
factor is dispositive in its determination.
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Upholding the “total mix” standard, the Court proffered several instances in
which the absence of statistical evidence could still lead a reasonable investor to
consider information regarding a product’s possible side effects as material. For
example, data extracted from studies with small sample sizes, non-randomized
experiments, and expert testimonies were considered highly persuasive in
establishing causation, despite the lack of traditional statistical significance. Further,
the Court noted that the FDA based its regulations on a variety of factors in
assigning causation to pharmaceutical products, naming significant statistical
evidence among them.
Turning to Matrixx’s contention that scientific and legal challenges to
Zicam’s safety were immaterial, the Court instead concluded that the defendant’s
failure to disclose such information “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information made available.” The complaint included information pertaining to
several medical reports made available to Matrixx, product liability lawsuits filed
against the company, and admissions that Matrixx executives sought to further
research the damaging claims. When considering the whole, the Court held, a
reasonable investor would regard the negative reports as materially affecting the
financial strength of Zicam, and thus potential transactions of Matrixx securities.
Lastly, the Court affirmed the finding that Matrixx “acted with scienter, ‘a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’” Following from
its finding on materiality, the Court held that, pursuant to the PSLRA, scienter is
established when a reasonable investor, considering the totality of the facts, can draw
an inference of the necessary intent. Because Matrixx knew of the existing medical
complaints and actively discredited the negative reports by issuing multiple press
releases, the Court reasoned that the company acted recklessly in protecting the
financial security of the Zicam pharmaceutical line. Thus, Matrixx acted with the
requisite intent to satisfy the element of scienter.
The holding in this case exposes corporations to liability for the nondisclosure of information once considered immaterial to investors. Matrixx Initiatives,
Inc. v. Siracusano illustrates that a corporation may not be shielded from lawsuits
brought by its investors when it communicates, or fails to communicate, relevant
information about its financial stability, even when that information may not be
supported by statistically significant evidence. Corporations must now operate with
heightened transparency and evaluate their actions and statements if they seek to
avoid claims of fraud.
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Practitioners should proceed with caution when representing clients involved
in the buying and selling of securities. Due to the discretionary nature of the “total
mix” test, transactional attorneys must carefully evaluate a company’s conduct in
relation to the elements of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule
10b-5. When advising business clients on whether information must be disclosed to
avoid legal action, attorneys must balance anticipated investor reactions, possibly
adverse to a company’s profits, with corporate interests.
________

During a Delaware court appraisal proceeding, corporations may disavow
previously prepared and distributed corporation-specific data during the
court's independent evaluation of the fair market value of the shares. Golden
Telecom, Inc., v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
By Zackarij R. Gardner
In Delaware, court appraisal of a corporation's stock after a merger or
acquisition provides a statutory means by which an acquired corporation’s
shareholders may ensure that the merger price is the fair value of the stock held by
the shareholders. When shareholders believe that the merger price is not the fair
value of the stock, they may elect for a court appraisal. This appraisal proceeding
prevents the undervaluation of the stock, ostensibly making a corporation more
attractive to potential buyers, and allows shareholders to receive fair value for their
stock. In Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, the Supreme Court of Delaware
addressed two related issues: first, whether a court must defer to the merger price in
making its fair value appraisal of an acquired corporation; and second, whether a
corporation is bound by previously prepared corporation-specific information during
an appraisal proceeding where the information prepared was distributed to
shareholders in a tender offer fairness opinion.
In Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, Vimpel-Communications
(“VimpelCom”) began its attempt to acquire Golden Telecom, Inc. (“Golden”) in
early 2007. Altimo and Telenor Group (collectively, “Altimo and Telenor”) together
held a majority of VimpelCom’s stock with 35% and 30%, respectively. Altimo and
Telenor were also the largest shareholders of Golden's stock, holding, respectively,
27% and 18%. In May of 2007, Golden created a special committee comprised of
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members unaffiliated with Altimo and Telenor to handle any potential merger
transactions.
In September 2007, VimpelCom proposed to buy Golden for $80 per share.
This offer and three subsequent offers were rejected by Golden. In early December
2007, VimpelCom made an offer of $105 per share. The special committee
recommended that the offer be accepted, and the Board of Directors approved the
deal. The special committee solicited no other potential buyers, and Altimo gave
notice that it would not accept a bidder other than VimpelCom.
In late December 2007, Golden distributed a fairness opinion prepared in
support of the merger price. Shortly thereafter, the companies signed a Merger
Agreement that included a cash tender offer for the outstanding shares of Golden's
common stock. It also required that all shares not tendered be converted into the
right to receive the same amount in cash per share. The vast majority of
shareholders tendered their shares; however, Global GT LP and Global GT Ltd.
(collectively, “Global”) refused to tender their shares. Instead, Global elected to
have the merger price appraised by a court as allowed under Delaware law. The
court of chancery appraised the stock as having a value of $125.49 per share at the
time of the merger and entered a judgment for Global accordingly.
Golden appealed the judgment, arguing that the court of chancery erred by
not deferring to the merger price. Supporting its argument by pointing to the armslength nature of the negotiations and the efficient market price, Golden contended
that the merger price indicated the fair value of the stock. It requested that a rule
requiring conclusive or, alternatively, presumptive deference to the merger price in
appraisal proceedings be adopted. Golden also objected to the court of chancery's
valuation of the stock, arguing that the vice chancellor erred by not giving weight to
market evidence regarding the value of the stock. Golden argued that the court erred
by making factual findings unsupported by the record while accepting and giving
weight to evidence given by Global. Global contested all of Golden's claims and
cross-appealed. Global contended that the court erred by using a tax bracket other
than the one used by Golden in its fairness opinion and that the court erred by not
considering other evidence it had offered.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held: (a) that the court of
chancery was not required to defer to the merger price in its fair value appraisal
evaluation; (b) it did not abuse its discretion in its valuation of the shares; and (c) the
court did not err by accepting the tax rate proffered by Golden during the appraisal
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proceeding, where a different rate was used in the tender offer fairness opinion.
Delaware law, codified at Delaware General Corporate Law Section 262(h), dictates
that the courts “shall determine the fair value of the shares . . . together with interest,
if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value” by “tak[ing] into
account all relevant factors.” It does not, on the other hand, mandate judicial
deference to an agreed-upon merger price. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that
courts must evaluate the “fair value” of the stock as a “going concern” to the
stockholder rather than the value of stock in the context of an acquisition.
The Delaware Supreme Court found that no deference is to be given to a
merger price and that courts must independently evaluate the fair value of a
corporation's stock as a going concern by considering all factors involved. To hold
otherwise, the court noted, would be contrary to the unambiguous language of the
statute, because it would effectively remove the courts from the appraisal process
and make that process less flexible. The appraisal process is necessarily flexible to
ensure that the fair value is reached. Forcing deference to the merger price would
harm the purpose and utility of judicial appraisal. Therefore, the court rejected
Golden's request to adopt a rule requiring judicial deference to merger prices. It
went on to reject the contention that the court erred in its valuation of the stock,
primarily because the court had considered all of the relevant factors. Thus, it was
proper for the court to adopt one expert's model and evidence over another's.
The Delaware Supreme Court also refused to adopt a bright line rule
preventing companies from disavowing corporation-specific data that they
previously sent to stockholders. The court stated that, although Global was correct
in asserting that stockholders are entitled to rely on the truthfulness of information
given to them by corporations, the judicial appraisal is an independent evaluation.
The evaluation requires flexibility and does not require a company to adhere to data
prepared to convince stockholders of the fairness of a tender offer. The court noted
that a “fair price” at the time of the tender offer stage under the circumstances of a
merger transaction is different than a “fair price” of a corporation as a going concern
at the appraisal stage. The court concluded that Delaware courts should weigh any
inconsistencies between the data offered by a company during the tender offer stage
and the data offered during the appraisal stage. Therefore, the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision reinforces the Delaware legislature's
intent to provide an independent means by which shareholders may ensure that the
merger price is the fair value of their shares; however, it also creates uncertainty in
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the merger process for the corporations and shareholders involved. No presumptive
deference to the merger price is mentioned in the statute, and the court made clear
that Delaware courts will not imply a presumption. During a merger or acquisition,
Delaware corporations must exhaustively search for the fair value of the corporation
to be acquired because Delaware courts will consider all of the factors involved
during their appraisals without deference to merger prices. A corporation cannot
rely on what it believes to be the efficient market price during a court's appraisal
because the court will not simply look at the transaction data; rather, courts look at
all relevant matters. Additionally, courts are not limited to the information provided
by corporations before or during the merger, and, importantly, a corporation may
offer information different from what it previously disseminated to shareholders.
However, this creates some uncertainty for Delaware corporations and the
attorneys representing them. Transactional attorneys and their clients may go
through the merger process believing they have found the “fair value” of the
corporation, but a court may come to a different conclusion. As the Delaware
Supreme Court noted, the fair value as a going concern at the appraisal stage is
different than the fair value during the tender offer stage. Due to this uncertainty, it
behooves attorneys representing Delaware corporations to find a merger price that
all shareholders will agree to, so that the uncertain court appraisal process may be
avoided. Although this may add time and expense to the initial process, it will avoid
the greater time and monetary costs of lengthy court appraisals—a fact clients will
likely appreciate.
Transactional attorneys who fail to take the time necessary to find a price
amenable to all shareholders are more likely to cost the corporate client additional
time and money, and, therefore, the client will be less likely to seek out the services
of the cost-increasing attorney for future transactions. Thus, it may be more prudent
to offer a preliminary tender offer to gauge likely shareholder support for the offer
before offering a final tender offer and completing the merger process to ensure that
clients' time and money are not unnecessarily wasted.
________
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SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
When a shareholder fails to present an allegation to a corporation’s directors,
a derivative action cannot be maintained unless particularized pleadings
demonstrate that such a demand would have been futile as to a majority of the
directors. In re Healthways, Inc. Derivative Litigation, No. M2009-02623-COA-R3-CV,
2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129, 2011 WL 882448 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011).
By Todd B. Skelton
Under Delaware General Corporation Law, for shareholders to pursue a
derivative action, they must either make a demand on the board of directors to bring
the suit or establish that such a demand would be futile. If the board refuses,
shareholders may bring the action by showing that the board wrongfully refused the
demand. If a demand was not made, shareholders must demonstrate why making
the demand would have been futile to excuse the demand requirement. In In re
Healthways, Inc. Derivative Litigation (“In re Healthways”), the Tennessee Court of
Appeals addressed the requirement that plaintiffs plead demand futility with
particularity when a shareholder of Healthways, Inc. (“Healthways”) bypassed the
board in filing a derivative action.
Healthways was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in Tennessee. As its name suggests, Healthways was a healthcare company providing
disease management solutions “to help people maintain or improve their health and .
. . reduce overall healthcare costs.” Healthways was a provider in the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services of Health and Human Services’ Medicare Health
Support Pilot Program (“MHSPP”). MHSPP sought to improve the quality of
healthcare provided to beneficiaries and implement cost saving measures for the
Medicare and Medicaid programs. Failure to meet a five percent cost savings criteria
at the end of the first phase could make Healthways liable for fees paid to the
company and disqualify Healthways from MHSPP’s second phase.
Quarterly reports from October 2007 to May 2009 allegedly showed that
Healthways was not meeting the MHSPP cost savings criteria. On January 7, 2008, it
was announced that the MHSPP criteria had been lowered “from 5% net savings to
budget neutrality.” Consequently, Healthways stock climbed to $67.21 per share,
only to drop to $31.54 on February 26, 2008, when the company released a press
release issuing revised financial targets for the year. During the period from October
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29, 2007, to January 9, 2008, three Healthways directors sold a total of 228,824
shares.
The plaintiff, a Healthways shareholder named Roy T. Forrest (“Plaintiff”),
filed a shareholder derivative suit on June 27, 2008, which was later consolidated
with a separate derivative action. The consolidated complaint “nam[ed] fifteen
current or former officers or directors of Healthways as defendants.” Healthways
maintained eleven director positions on its board. Plaintiff alleged that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties by disseminating false and misleading
information and failing to properly oversee and maintain adequate internal controls.
Plaintiff further alleged that certain defendants breached their duty of loyalty by
trading on insider information. Plaintiff filed the action without making a demand
on Healthways’ board of directors. The trial court dismissed the action “on the
ground that plaintiff failed to allege with requisite particularity that such demand
would have been futile.”
Delaware law provides that “when demand has not been made . . . the
complaint is subject to dismissal unless the plaintiff can plead with requisite
particularity why it would be futile to make a demand upon the board of directors.”
If the complaint is pled with the requisite particularity, the demand requirement is
excused. The demand futility standard established in Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,
934 (Del. 1993) provides that demand may be excused as futile if “the particularized
factual allegations of a derivative [shareholder] complaint create a reasonable doubt
that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly
exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a
demand.” When the corporate charter includes an exculpation clause, demand will
not be excused for a director’s breach of the duty of care but may be excused “where
there are particularized allegations that the directors breached their duties of loyalty
or good faith.”
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that, when a shareholder
fails to present the allegation to the corporation’s directors, a derivative action can
only be maintained if particularized pleadings demonstrate that such a demand would
have been futile as to a majority of the directors. Ultimately, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the derivative action. In doing so, the court first considered the insider
trading and misappropriation of information claim. Facts about the directors’ inside
knowledge of MHSPP and Healthways’ earnings allowed an inference that three
directors knew material, non-public information and traded on the basis of such
information. The directors were not protected by Healthways’ exculpation clause
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because insider trading constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty. Demand to the
three directors would have been futile but was not excused with regard to the
insider-trading claim for lack of a majority of directors.
The court next considered a related claim regarding whether the board’s
Governance Committee allowed the improper sales to occur. None of the three
directors who allegedly traded on non-public information were on the committee.
The court found no breach of the duty of good faith because Plaintiff did not allege
that the committee had knowledge of the trades. Moreover, no particularized facts
supported an inference that the directors breached their duty of loyalty, so demand
was not excused.
The court next considered whether the members of the Audit Committee
failed to maintain adequate internal controls or breached their fiduciary duties by
disseminating false and misleading information. By merely alleging that the directors
received quarterly reports regarding MSHPP and listing the committee’s
responsibilities as described in the charter, Plaintiff failed to establish any failure of
the directors’ responsibilities regarding the receipt of information. Demand was not
excused because the allegations regarding inadequate internal controls were not
sufficient to support finding a breach of the duty of good faith. Further, Plaintiff
made only conclusory allegations that the directors were accountable for Healthways’
press releases and financial statements, and there were no allegations that the
directors participated in the dissemination of false and misleading information.
Therefore, demand was not excused because there was no breach of the duties of
good faith and loyalty.
Additionally, the court determined that potential futility for two directors
that were employed by Healthways still did not excuse demand. One served as Chief
Executive Officer and President, and the other was a consultant who was already
“counted” for purposes of demand futility from the insider-trading claim. Rales
requires that demand be futile as to a majority of directors, and Plaintiff could at
most demonstrate futility for four of the eleven.
Finally, the court rejected Plaintiff’s allegation that a federal court’s denial of
a motion to dismiss a securities action regarding the alleged insider trades was
relevant to the demand futility analysis. The demand futility standard was higher
than the standard for a motion to dismiss. Even if the analyses had not been
distinct, Plaintiff still would have been unable to establish the majority required to
excuse demand.
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In re Healthways construes the Delaware General Corporation Law, which is
important because of the number of Delaware corporations doing business
throughout the United States. The decision has implications for counsel of both
corporations and potential plaintiffs. In re Healthways demonstrates the importance
of drafting comprehensive exculpation provisions into corporate charters. The
Healthways exculpation clause limited the liability of its directors for monetary
damages for breaches of the duty of care, and the Plaintiff needed to establish a
breach of the duties of loyalty or good faith to excuse demand. An exculpation
clause can therefore force a plaintiff to find a different claim on which to sue.
Additionally, In re Healthways provides guidance for pleading demand futility.
Counsel must carefully weigh the decision of whether or not to make a demand on
the board. Not surprisingly, the general view is that boards typically reject the
demand. Once the board refuses, a shareholder must prove that the board did so
wrongfully. The board has on its side the business judgment rule, a defense in which
courts generally defer to board decisions. On the other hand, a shareholder can file
the suit without making a demand but must prove demand futility. Rebutting the
business judgment rule requires showing that directors were interested, so plaintiffs
must commit on the front-end the resources necessary to filing a complaint that
pleads with requisite particularity facts sufficient to demonstrate that demand would
have been futile as to a majority of the directors. If demand is not excused, however,
the action is dismissed and the shareholder must then make the demand.
________
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TAX
Residents who work long hours, are highly skilled, and enjoy similar benefits
to career employees do not qualify for the income tax exemption given to
students employed by a school, college, or university. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
By Jeremy Jones
Enacted by Congress to help fund Social Security, the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (“FICA”) requires employers and employees to pay taxes on
earned wages. However, Congress has exempt certain individuals from FICA’s
demands, and, not surprisingly, employers and employees often seek the approval of
Congress to qualify for a lawful tax exemption. In Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education and Research v. United States, the United States Supreme Court addressed
“whether doctors who serve as medical residents are properly viewed as ‘student[s]’
whose service Congress has exempted from FICA taxes under 26 U.S.C. §
3121(b)(10).”
The Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research (“Mayo”) offers
residency programs to doctors who have graduated from medical school and seek
additional training in a specialized area of medicine. Although residents complete an
educational curriculum consisting of weekly lectures, readings, and written exams,
Mayo’s residents typically spend fifty to eighty hours per week—the majority of their
time—caring for, diagnosing, and treating patients. As a result of their medical
services, residents receive paid vacation time and monetary stipends which in 2005
ranged between $41,000 and $56,000 per resident, as well as health insurance and
malpractice insurance.
Recognized by Congress as a valid tax exemption under § 3121(b)(10) of the
Internal Revenue Code, the student exception exempts from taxation “service
performed in the employ of . . . a school, college, or university . . . if such service is
performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such
school, college, or university.” Beginning in 1951, the Treasury Department
(“Department”) applied the student exception to students who worked for their
schools “as an incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study.” By
comparing the number of hours worked with the number of courses taken, the
Department determined on a case-by-case basis whether a student’s work was
incident to his or her studies and thus tax exempt. Additionally, although the Social
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Security Administration (“SSA”) similarly applied a case-by-case approach to its
“corresponding student exception in the Social Security Act,” the SSA categorically
excluded medical residents from the benefits of the tax exemption.
However, medical residents soon filled the court system with claims seeking
FICA tax refunds when, in 1998, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
SSA could no longer categorically, and therefore automatically, exclude residents
from the student exception. Fearing continuous litigation, the Department created a
new categorical rule—the full-time employee rule— in 2004 to help combat the
bombardment of claims. Under the rule, full-time employees (i.e., those individuals
working forty hours or more per week) do not qualify for § 3121(b)(10)’s tax
exemption. Moreover, the Department advised that “an employee’s service is
‘incident’ to his studies only when ‘[t]he educational aspect of the relationship
between the employer and the employee, as compared to the service aspect of the
relationship, [is] predominate.’”
Mayo filed suit in the United States District Court, seeking tax refunds of the
money it had withheld from residents’ stipends during the second quarter of 2005
and claiming the full-time employee rule was an invalid interpretation of §
3121(b)(10). Relying on the analysis in National Muffler Dealers Assn., Inc. v. United
States (“National Muffler”), the district court concluded that the Department’s full-time
employee rule was inconsistent with § 3121(b)(10)’s “unambiguous text.” The
district court interpreted § 3121(b)(10) to mean that “an employee is a ‘student’ so
long as the educational aspect of his service predominates over the service aspect of
the relationship with his employer.”
The Government appealed and the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s decision and approved the Department’s statutory interpretation regarding §
3121(b)(10). Relying on the opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the appellate court determined that § 3121(b)(10) “is silent or ambiguous
on the question [of] whether a medical resident working for the school full-time is a
‘student.’” Mayo’s petition for certiorari was granted, and the United States Supreme
Court found the Department’s full-time employee rule a fair and reasonable
interpretation of § 3121(b)(10).
Case law stipulates that Chevron’s two-part analysis is appropriate in cases
where an administrative agency (i.e., the Department) has and exercises the
Congressional authority to “engage in the process of rulemaking.” Under Chevron
step-one, the Court asks whether Congress has previously addressed the specific
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question at issue: whether medical residents are exempt from taxation under §
3121(b)(10). The Court first held that Congress had neither addressed this exact
question nor defined the term “student” as used in § 3121(b)(10). Next, the Court
applied Chevron’s second step, which asks whether the Department’s full-time
employee rule is a “reasonable interpretation” of § 3121(b)(10). Against Mayo’s
objections, the Court held that, because administrative consistency and efficiency
would be better served, the Department’s full-time employee rule was a fair
assessment of § 3121(b)(10).
The Court was not convinced by Mayo’s claim that National Muffler’s more
complex, multi-factored analysis should serve as the benchmark when analyzing an
ambiguous portion of the Internal Revenue Code. Unless a contrary reason for
applying a “less deferential standard of review” (i.e., National Muffler) appears, the
United States Supreme Court is compelled to apply the precedents of Chevron in a tax
case. Additionally, the Court made clear that, although medical residents are not
considered students, residents and their families would remain eligible for Social
Security coverage and benefits.
The United States Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the full-time
employee rule should serve as a learning experience to medical residents and
residency programs. While the Supreme Court’s ruling means that residents working
39.99 hours or less per week are considered students and, therefore, are in
compliance with § 3121(b)(10)’s regulations, the vast majority of all medical residents
will not meet this criteria, because residents typically spend fifty to eighty hours per
week working rather than studying. Transactional attorneys, in particular tax
attorneys, should inform their clients of § 3121(b)(10)’s forty hour benchmark and
the impact it may have on the residents’ annual stipends.
________

A multistate corporation’s capital gains from a one-time acquisition and sale
of stock through restructuring activities with its parent corporation represent
“business earnings” subject to the Tennessee excise tax. Blue Bell Creameries, LP
v. Roberts, 333 S.W.3d 59 (Tenn. 2010).
By Caleb Barron
In order to impose an excise tax on a multistate enterprise conducting
business in Tennessee, the earnings in question must be “business earnings” as
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defined by the Tennessee excise tax statute, in addition to satisfying the parallel
restrictions imposed by the Due Process and Commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution. In Blue Bell Creameries, LP v. Roberts, the Tennessee Supreme Court held
that, pursuant to the Tennessee excise tax statute, the taxpayer’s capital gains from a
one-time acquisition and sale of stock represented “business earnings” and that a tax
assessment on those earnings did not violate the United States Constitution.
Blue Bell Creameries, LP (“Taxpayer”) produced, sold, and distributed Blue
Bell ice cream throughout Tennessee and other states. On January 1, 2001,
Taxpayer’s parent corporation, Blue Bell Creameries, USA, Inc. (“BBC USA”)
reorganized itself and Taxpayer to decrease their relative tax exposure. To achieve
the desired reorganization, 250 stockholders of BBC USA exchanged all of their
shares in BBC USA for an equivalent interest in Taxpayer’s limited partnership.
BBC USA then redeemed the stock transferred to Taxpayer for $142,506,000, and
the reorganization was complete. The reorganization allowed BBC USA and its
subsidiaries to remove one level of federal income taxation and remain privately held
companies, therefore reducing overall expenses.
Taxpayer reported $119,909,317 in capital gains stemming from the Stock
Transaction on its 2001 federal income tax return and Tennessee excise tax return.
On the Tennessee return, the capital gains were classified as non-business earnings
and were therefore exempt from the excise tax. After conducting an audit, the
Tennessee Department of Revenue (the “Department”) alternatively classified the
capital gains as business earnings subject to the excise tax and assessed $146,025.25
against Taxpayer. In response, Taxpayer made the payment in full and filed a
complaint against the Department in chancery court for a refund of $128,407 plus
interest and attorney’s fees. Both parties moved for summary judgment and neither
contested any fact in the opposing party’s statements.
Taxpayer moved for summary judgment alleging that the imposition of the
tax was improper under the Tennessee excise tax statute and alternatively violated
the United States Constitution. The Department filed its own motion for summary
judgment alleging that the tax assessment was valid under both the Tennessee statute
and the United States Constitution. Subsequently, the chancery court granted
Taxpayer’s motion and awarded Taxpayer a refund of $167,779.07. The court of
appeals affirmed the lower court and held that the tax assessment was
unconstitutional because there was insufficient evidence showing that the two
entities were functionally integrated so as to satisfy the unitary business principle.
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In order to determine whether a company’s earnings should be classified as
“business” or “nonbusiness” earnings, the Tennessee legislature has explicitly
adopted the “functional test.” The functional test provides that business earnings
mean “earnings arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the
taxpayer’s trade or business or earnings from tangible and intangible property if the
acquisition, use, management or disposition of the property constitutes an integral
part of the taxpayer’s regular trade or business operations.” There is a split among
courts on how to properly apply the functional test to investment earnings. One
approach, adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court, considers the ownership
or control the company exercised over the property as an additional inquiry and
defines the word “integral” as “essential to completeness.” The alternative approach,
adopted by the California Supreme Court, focuses on the control exerted over the
property, instead of actual ownership, and defines the word “integral” as an organic
unity between the income-producing property and the taxpayer’s business activities.
In addition to the “business earnings” requirement, the attempt to assess
excise taxes on the earnings of multistate entities must be constitutional. There are
two constitutional limitations placed on a state’s ability to tax outside its borders
through the requirement of Due Process and the Commerce Clause. The Supreme
Court has held that in order to pass constitutional muster there must be a “minimum
connection” or “nexus” between the interstate activities and the taxing state. Once
such a connection is established, the taxable portion of the earnings is determined
through the use of the “unitary business principle.” A state may apportion earnings
following this principle only if the entity’s intrastate and extrastate activities formed
part of a single unitary business.
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held in Blue Bell Creameries, LP v.
Roberts that, pursuant to T.C.A. § 67-4-2004(1), Blue Bell’s capital gains from a onetime acquisition and sale of stock represented “business earnings” subject to the
Tennessee excise tax statute, and the tax assessment did not violate the United States
Constitution. The court based its holding on the following findings: (1) the earnings
from the stock transaction constituted business earnings under the Tennessee excise
tax statute following California’s interpretation of the functional test; (2) the stock
transaction was unitary with Taxpayer’s ice cream business in Tennessee; and (3) the
tax assessment was valid under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution.
In first determining how to classify the earnings, the court followed the
California Supreme Court’s less restrictive application of the functional test, which

2011]

CASE COMMENTARIES

209

required only that the taxpayer “control, but not necessarily own” the property. By
applying this standard the court found that the stock transaction was a “necessary
step” in the businesses reorganization because it “reduced expenses that detracted
from the earnings arising from the sale of Blue Bell ice cream in Tennessee and
elsewhere.”
Concluding that the tax assessment was proper, the court then turned to the
question of whether the assessment was valid under the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution. The court first applied the unitary
business principle adopted by the United States Supreme Court for determining such
constitutional issues. Specifically, the court applied the “operational-function”
concept that focuses the unitary business principle on income derived from assets.
After a review of Supreme Court cases applying the concept, the court concluded
that the stock transaction did indeed serve an operational function, rather than
investment function; therefore, the earnings were unitary with the business and
apportionable by the state.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Blue Bell Creameries, LP v. Roberts
illustrates an expansion of the State’s power to assess excise taxes on the earnings of
a multistate entity, specifically pertaining to a reorganization involving a subsidiary
and its pure holding company parent. Attorneys should be mindful that economic
transfers under restructuring, or similar non-income producing or investment
activities, may be taxable under this newest standard set forth by the Tennessee
Supreme Court. In the endless search for minimal tax liability, Tennessee
transactional attorneys should strive to minimize tax exposure by ensuring that
earnings from investments not used for operational expenses are clearly shown as
such. Under this new standard, attorneys should be more aware of the potential
excise tax implications of expense reductions and similar positive effects on the
balance sheet resulting from non-income producing activities. If this distinction is
not clearly made, such earnings may be taxable by the State of Tennessee.
________

